



Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~

HR70-14

APPROVED FOR RELEASE -  
HISTORICAL COLLECTION  
DIVISION HR70-14 DATE:  
07-18-2012

# Warsaw Pact: Planning for Operations Against Denmark

A Research Paper

~~Top Secret~~

SOV 89-10030CX

April 1989

Copy

000



Directorate of  
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



# Warsaw Pact: Planning for Operations Against Denmark



A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted]  
[redacted] Office of Soviet Analysis, with  
assistance from [redacted]  
SOVA, and with a contribution from [redacted]  
Office of European Analysis, [redacted]

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to [redacted]  
SOVA [redacted]



Reverse Blank

~~Top Secret~~  
SOV 89-10030CX  
April 1989

~~Top Secret~~

Warsaw Pact: Planning for  
Operations Against Denmark

**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 1 January 1989  
was used in this report.*

A substantial body of evidence indicates that, in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, Pact planners remain committed to a coordinated, phased offensive operation against Denmark. Such an operation would be undertaken in support of the Pact's main offensive against NATO's center. Pact plans appear to envisage initiating the operation through Jutland into Denmark prior to NATO reinforcement, after destroying or neutralizing NATO air, air defense, and naval forces in southern Denmark and northern West Germany, and after the required Pact transport, fighter aircraft, and other support assets become available. Four divisions probably would attack the Jutland Peninsula and Fyn Island, while naval infantry, airborne, sea-landing, and mechanized elements would assault Sjaelland Island (Zealand). The operation would place a heavy demand on Soviet military airlift and sealift assets and also would pose major naval mineclearing problems for Pact commanders.

Because of these considerations, and the prohibitive risks and uncertainties associated with initiating airborne and amphibious operations prior to attaining air superiority and sea supremacy, we believe the operation would not be planned to begin before late in the first week of the war. Pact planners would prefer to launch the operation earlier but apparently believe operational constraints preclude this course of action.

Recent Warsaw Pact announcements regarding unilateral reductions and the reorientation of their forces toward defense could eventually lead to a less threatening and less capable array of Pact forces opposite Denmark. Nevertheless,

Soviet war planners continue to attempt to improve Pact capabilities for airborne and amphibious operations against Denmark in the context of a theaterwide offensive against NATO. They have been refining their force structure, streamlining command and control procedures, and updating assault planning in the region. We believe this activity stems from Soviet concern over force deficiencies in the Pact's existing planning and uncertainty about the reliability and capabilities of Polish forces. Other major considerations for Pact planners may be their perceptions that NATO's military strategy has become more offensive and that NATO forces available for employment in the Danish area have become more capable. Improvements may be an outgrowth of the development and maturation of Soviet concepts for combined, theaterwide offensive operations.

Reverse Blank

~~Top Secret~~  
SOV 89-10030CX  
April 1989




### Contents


	<i>Page</i>
Summary	iii
The Basic Scenario	1
Rationale for Planning Changes	2
The Current Operational Environment	4
Conclusions	6
<b>Appendixes</b>	
A. Non-US NATO and National Ground Forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark When Fully Mobilized	7
B. Highlights of Pact Amphibious Exercises in the Baltic Region, January 1984-September 1988	9
C. Warsaw Pact Air Operations Versus Denmark	11



### Warsaw Pact Assault Operations Against Denmark



715642 (000775) 3-89



## Warsaw Pact: Planning for Operations Against Denmark

In recent years, Soviet and East European leaders have stressed such topics as "defensive defense and reasonable sufficiency;" however, Soviet war planners apparently have not as yet reduced the importance they attach to planning for offensive operations in the Baltic region in the early stages of a general offensive against NATO. Recent Warsaw Pact announcements regarding unilateral force cuts and the reorientation over time of forces toward defense could lead to a reduction in the threat of an immediate military assault against Denmark. Nonetheless, unless the overall strategic concept of offensive or counteroffensive operations into NATO territory is clearly abandoned, assault operations against Denmark will remain an element of Pact planning for war against NATO. In particular, Pact planners would hope to seize Denmark in support of offensive operations on the main attack axis in Central Europe. The Pact would gain significant military and political advantages by a successful assault against Denmark: control of the Danish Straits and airspace and the potential damage to NATO's political structure if a member country were defeated at a critical point early in the war. 

Pact control of Denmark would prevent NATO from operating naval or amphibious forces against the Pact's flank or rear via the Baltic Sea. It also would afford Pact naval and, especially, air forces access to the North Sea littoral, potentially hindering NATO's critical supply by sea and threatening bases in the United Kingdom. Economic and political centers in southern Norway also would be put at risk. 


Control of the Danish Straits would require not only landings on the Danish Islands but also the conquest of the entire Jutland Peninsula (see map). Seizure of the Danish Islands would keep NATO maritime forces out of the Baltic; however, without a coordinated advance into Jutland, it would also expose those Pact forces involved to attack from northwestern Europe, southern Norway, and the United Kingdom. 



The basic scenario underlying Pact planning against Denmark has remained unchanged conceptually since the 1970s. 

### The Basic Scenario

Good  reporting throughout the 1970s and early 1980s showed that Pact planning against Denmark remained relatively constant during that period. The basic scenario for operations in the region at that time—unchanged conceptually to date—was as follows:

- Pact forces first would launch operations to destroy or neutralize NATO's air, air defense, and naval forces.
- On day 3 of the war, the Polish-commanded front<sup>1</sup> would begin offensive operations into Jutland and along the coastal axis toward Brussels and the French border.
- The main effort of the front would be an offensive along the coastal axis to seize crossing points over the Rhine River—the initial objective—and then to proceed to the French border via Brussels. Along this main axis, the 2nd Polish Army would serve initially as the front's first echelon, with the 4th Polish Army in the second echelon ready to be committed once the front attained its immediate objectives across the Rhine. One Soviet tank army

<sup>1</sup> A front is a joint-forces command, roughly analogous to a Western army group, consisting of ground and air forces, combat support elements, and, sometimes, naval forces. Although front command and control elements exist , fronts are activated as commands only in wartime. 



from the western USSR also could be used to augment the offensive on this axis. Pact planners expected the entire operation along this axis—to the French border and North Sea coast—to be completed by days 12 to 14 of the war.

- The front's secondary offensive effort would be to attack into the Jutland Peninsula and against Sjaelland Island (Zealand) to seize Denmark and secure the Danish Straits. The 1st Polish Army, supported by airborne and amphibious forces, would conduct the operation. Along this axis, four divisions of the 1st Army—the 8th and 12th Mechanized Divisions and the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions—would be responsible for seizing the Jutland Peninsula and Fyn Island. A joint airborne and amphibious operation against Sjaelland would involve the Polish 6th Airborne and 7th Sea-Landing Divisions (these small divisions were both redesignated brigades in 1986), as well as Poland's 15th Mechanized Division. This force would operate in conjunction with the Baltic Fleet's 336th Naval Infantry Regiment and units of the 3rd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (Klaipeda, USSR). In addition, units of the East German 8th Motorized Rifle Division might be involved.
- The first echelon divisions of the 1st Army, that is, the 8th and 12th Mechanized Divisions, would be committed at a point near the inner-German border and attack on the Schwerin-Rendsburg-Frederikshavn axis. The 8th Mechanized Division would advance west on a line north of Hamburg to secure positions on the north bank of the Elbe River to block the river access to Hamburg. The 12th Mechanized Division would attack north through Schleswig-Holstein and into Denmark to the Kolding-Vamdrop-Bramming line—the immediate objective on this axis—by about day 7 of the war. On day 8, the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions would be committed from the 1st Army's second echelon and would continue the attack north to Frederikshavn—the subsequent objective. As the two armored divisions started this advance to the north, the 12th Mechanized Division would swing to the east to secure Fyn Island.

- The offensive against Sjaelland also would begin on day 8 of the war. The 6th Airborne Division would conduct an airborne operation in the vicinity of Haslev early that day, and the 7th Sea-Landing Division, supported by the Combined Baltic Fleet and under East German air cover, would conduct amphibious assaults to establish beachheads in the bays of Koge and Faske. The 15th Mechanized Division, transported to Sjaelland on Polish merchant ships, would land by the end of day 8 and advance north to Helsingor, bypassing Copenhagen. There it would secure positions on the north and northeast Danish coasts to protect naval passage through the Danish Straits. Part of the airborne-amphibious force would move west to Korsor Harbor and take up positions along the west coast to protect sea passage between Sjaelland and Fyn Island. Reinforced battalion-size forces would carry the offensive into the Falster and Lolland Islands.
- If resistance were strong on Fyn and Sjaelland Islands, the operation to seize Denmark probably would not be completed until day 13 of the war.

#### Rationale for Planning Changes

Polish planners in the late 1970s recognized that force requirements for operations against Denmark, coupled with commitments for operations on the northern coastal axis, could overtax the capabilities of Polish forces—especially the air forces. In addition, as the Polish crisis of 1980-81 deepened, Pact leaders became concerned that the unrest could degrade Polish military capabilities to carry out assigned wartime missions. During that period, the Poles reportedly sought from the Soviets a reduction of Polish missions within the war plan. Although we have no firm evidence of a formal reassessment, the Soviets in the 1980s appear to have been modifying war plans for the region. In particular, the mix of Pact forces exercising the offensive scenario has varied in recent years. (See table for a comparative listing of available forces possibly earmarked for the Pact offensive against Denmark in 1978 and 1987.)

~~Top Secret~~

**Table 1**  
**Full Mobilization of Warsaw Pact Assault/Combat**  
**Forces Versus Schleswig-Holstein and**  
**Denmark, 1978 and 1987**

Nationality	Unit	Personnel <sup>a</sup>	Tanks <sup>a</sup>	
			Number	Type
<b>1978 Total</b>		<b>85,500</b>	<b>1,720</b>	
Polish		59,900	1,240	
	6th Airborne Division	4,000	0	
	7th Sea-Landing Division	5,600	90	PT-76s
	8th Mechanized Division	11,000	185	T-54/55s
	12th Mechanized Division	11,300	200	T-54/55s
	15th Mechanized Division	10,500	195	T-34/T-54/55s
	16th Armored Division	8,900	285	T-54/55s
	20th Armored Division	8,600	285	T-54/55s
Soviet		14,000	255	
	336th Naval Infantry Regiment (Baltic Fleet)	2,000	40	PT-76/T-55s
	3rd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (Baltic Military District)	12,000	215	T-54/55s
East German		11,600	225	
	8th Motorized Rifle Division	11,600	225	PT-76/T-55s
<b>1987 Total</b>		<b>110,500</b>	<b>2,090</b>	
Polish		60,000	1,285	
	6th Airborne Brigade	4,200	0	
	7th Sea-Landing Brigade	5,600	90	PT-76s
	8th Mechanized Division	11,000	200	T-54/55s
	12th Mechanized Division	11,300	200	T-54/55s
	15th Mechanized Division	10,500	225	T-34/T-54/55s
	16th Armored Division	8,900	285	T-54/55Rs
	20th Armored Division	8,600	285	T-54/55/72s
Soviet		38,000	580	
	336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet)	3,400	40	PT-76/T-55s
	6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (Northern Group of Forces)	14,000	270	T-80s
	7th Guards Airborne Division (Baltic Military District)	7,400	0	
	94th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany)	14,000	270	T-64s
East German		11,600	225	
	8th Motorized Rifle Division	11,600	225	PT-76/T-55s

<sup>a</sup> Personnel figures are rounded to nearest hundred; tank figures are rounded to nearest 5.

~~Top Secret~~

Another consideration for Pact planners in recent years may have been their perception of NATO force developments. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviets saw:

- Development of a new, more offensive NATO maritime strategy, accompanied by quantitative increases and qualitative improvements in NATO naval forces in the region.
- Improvements in NATO air forces and a more aggressive NATO approach to the air-land campaign.
- Increases in the size and capabilities of NATO ground forces earmarked for wartime operations in the Jutland area. For example, the Soviets may have inferred (incorrectly) from NATO exercises that a British corps and a West German mechanized division would operate in the region. They may also believe that US Marine Corps units have contingency missions in the vicinity. (See appendix A for a listing of non-US NATO and Danish ground forces available for wartime operations in the area.)

[redacted]

Yet another important factor behind the Soviets' reexamination of options against Denmark may be their own development of combined, theaterwide offensive operations.

[redacted]

Formal Pact acceptance (except Romania) in 1979-80 of the "Wartime Statute" institutionalized a wartime command structure that would give the Soviets control of combined, joint operations in the Western and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations (TMOs).<sup>2</sup>

[redacted]

<sup>2</sup> A TMO is a particular territory (with associated air, space, and sea areas) that may cross national boundaries, within which armed forces conduct related strategic operations. (U)

#### The Current Operational Environment

Pact military planners remain committed to the concept of a combined airborne-amphibious operation against the Danish Islands. That operation currently is planned to occur in conjunction with a land thrust into the Jutland area, requiring linkup and subsequent offensive operations to secure the rest of Denmark. Because Soviet planners now perceive significantly increased force requirements in the region, the Pact is working to refine its capabilities to accomplish assigned objectives in the region.

[redacted]

In part, the Pact has improved its ability to conduct successful operations against Denmark through forcewide improvements (for example, increased emphasis on combined-arms formations; fielding of more capable artillery systems; deployment of newer generation tanks and armored vehicles; introduction of better helicopters and combat aircraft; and improvements in the capabilities of air-cushion vehicles).

[redacted]

[Large redacted area]

[redacted]

Our analysis of recent exercises sheds light on the key question of the timing of the airborne-amphibious operation against Denmark. Some of the exercise scenarios suggest that the operation would be launched on day 1 or 2 of the war, but others imply a later assault. In any case, we believe that Pact commanders would *prefer* to seize objectives in Denmark in the first days of a NATO-Pact war to facilitate the success of their theater strategic offensive. Nonetheless, certain prerequisites—principally air and sea supremacy—must be met before such operations can be launched with any reasonable expectations of success. The Soviets probably believe that, in a conventional conflict, contests for control of the sky and the Baltic Sea probably would go on for at least the first several days of the war. The assault operation also would depend heavily on the success of the complementary Pact land offensive northward through Schleswig-Holstein and the Jutland Peninsula, allowing for an early linkup with the assault landing forces. In the absence of any one of these components—air superiority, sea supremacy, and a successful land offensive—Pact planners would believe that the assault landing operation probably would fail.

There are a number of risks involved for the Pact in launching an assault landing operation against Denmark during the first days of a NATO-Pact war. As the theaterwide air supremacy campaign unfolded, air assets critical to the success of the assault would be forced to attempt reconnaissance, fighter protection, and ground support operations in contested airspace. (See appendix C for a description of Pact air operations against Denmark.) Furthermore, the substantial airlift resources required to deliver the essential elements of an airborne division to objectives in Denmark—80 to 90 percent of the Soviets' total military air transport force—would be at substantial risk in such an environment.

An analogous situation probably would develop at sea. The seizure of sea supremacy would be an essential prerequisite to the operation and an important determinant in its timing. The Soviets probably expect NATO to exercise air-sea denial of the southern Baltic Sea region upon the outbreak of war. Mounting

an early amphibious operation, therefore, would involve moving vulnerable shipping into NATO-controlled or contested waters while simultaneously attempting to achieve air supremacy, clear the region of NATO submarines and fast patrol boats, and sweep mines.

The mineclearing phase of the operation could pose particularly difficult problems for Pact commanders. Danish military leaders have identified naval mining operations as a decisive element of their national defense and accordingly have placed considerable emphasis on developing and maintaining their mining capabilities, including providing for wartime coverage of minefields by combat aircraft and shore-based artillery. At the same time, the basic mineclearing capabilities of Soviet mine warfare forces are poor. Many Pact minesweepers are equipped with gear that is out of date by Western standards, and participation by mine-warfare units in amphibious exercises usually has been artificial, often with no actual streaming of minesweeping gear.

Analysis of the Soviets' actual minesweeping efforts—for example, against their own mines in the Gulf of Suez in 1974—suggests that their mine countermeasures (MCM) forces may have great difficulties in clearing NATO minefields under wartime conditions, especially when faced with complex Western mines activated by various combinations of magnetic, acoustic, and pressure triggers.

The nature of the sea bottom and channels found in the Danish Straits provides an ideal environment for laying bottom mines, which, because of the hydrographic environment of the area, probably would be difficult and time consuming to locate and neutralize. The Soviets understand this potential problem and might be able to offset this MCM disadvantage somewhat by using explosive ordnance—especially developed for MCM purposes—to destroy mines located within the transit lanes leading to amphibious landing areas.

~~Top Secret~~

Despite the countermeasures the Pact might choose to use, clearing NATO mines from the Straits would require careful planning and precise navigation because of the unfamiliar waters. Pact sweeping of, or hunting for, NATO mines in the Danish Straits probably could be accomplished only with extensive air cover and support from surface combatants. This suggests that the Pact would attempt such operations only after its forces had gained—at least temporarily—sea control and air superiority in the western Baltic. [ ]

Beyond the formidable mineclearing challenges facing the Pact, there are broader resource constraints. To put together a combined force capable of successfully conducting assault landing operations against Denmark earlier than currently planned, the Soviets would have to divert air, airborne, and ground forces from the main offensive against NATO's center. This force drain would endanger the primary air operation and the central breakthrough effort in the Western TMO, risking theater objectives and, ultimately, the success of the theater strategic offensive. For this reason, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would adopt this option.<sup>3</sup> [ ]

<sup>3</sup> When implemented, the force reductions and doctrinal changes recently announced by Soviet and East European leaders would result in a further diminution of the capability of Pact forces to carry out early offensive assault operations against Denmark. In order to play an effective role in the offensive, some units would have to be reconstituted—manned, equipped, and possibly retrained—prior to commitment to the conflict. [ ]

The arrival of sizable NATO reinforcements—in particular, a US Marine Expeditionary Force—in the region prior to the beginning of hostilities would have a significant impact on the Pact's planned assault landing operation. Pact commanders would be confronted with the undesirable options of proceeding against a strengthened enemy, delaying the operation until additional forces could be diverted from other areas to cope with the NATO reinforcements, or forgoing the operation entirely. Each of these alternatives would further increase the risks of failure associated with the theater offensive's main effort against NATO's Central Region. [ ]

#### Conclusions

In sum, we believe the Soviets would launch their primary assault landing operation against Denmark only after the air and sea supremacy battles had been at least temporarily won—in the most optimistic scenario, probably not before late in the first week of hostilities. Pact planners would prefer to attack earlier but apparently are constrained by operational considerations. Only if the constraints could be overcome would NATO face an increased possibility of assault landings against the Danish Straits earlier in the war, and this would be highly unlikely. [ ]

~~Top Secret~~

Appendix A

Non-US NATO and National Ground Forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark When Fully Mobilized

The non-US NATO ground forces available for the defense of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark at full mobilization consist of West German and Danish Army and militia units. The area falls under the control of NATO's Baltic Approaches Command (BALTAP), which includes Allied Forces, Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT), and Sjaelland (COMZEALAND).

LANDJUT, the only multinational corps that would fight in West Germany, consists of the German 6th Panzergrenadier Division, the Danish Jutland Division, assorted West German and Danish nondivisional corps units, and national militia forces from both countries. The corps is expected to defend Schleswig-Holstein and the Jutland Peninsula along a line from Hamburg to Luebeck. The Jutland Brigade, a Danish light infantry brigade, would be available to BALTAP to reinforce LANDJUT.

Upon mobilization, COMZEALAND would be a purely Danish force consisting of several regimental combat teams on the Danish Islands. This force is expected to resist any Pact airborne or amphibious force that penetrates West German and Danish air and naval defenses.

The Bundeswehr combat units in Schleswig-Holstein are maintained at relatively high levels of readiness. The typical combat unit is manned in peacetime at 80 percent of wartime authorized strength. The units are generally well equipped but not to the extent that units elsewhere in West Germany are. Although nominally light infantry units, the West German Territorial Forces in the area have been equipped with heavier weapons, including Leopard I tanks, in recent years. These units would provide rear-area security between the corps' main defense positions and the Danish border.

The Danish units committed to LANDJUT are nominally the largest and best equipped units in the Royal Danish Army; however, these units are manned in

Table 2  
Full Mobilization of Danish and West German Forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark

Nationality	Unit	Personnel	Equipment	
			Tanks	Antitank Weapons
Total		172,816	640	420
West German		43,316		
	6th Panzer-grenadier Division	26,847		
	Nondivisional corps troops	7,339		
	41st Territorial Defense Command	9,130		
Danish		129,500		
	Royal Danish Army	72,000		
	Home Guard	57,500		


peacetime at less than 25 percent of their wartime strength, are armed with 1960's vintage weapons, and are poorly trained. Unlike the West German Territorial Forces, the Danish Home Guard units in the area are equipped solely with small arms.

The Danish forces in COMZEALAND are less capable than the Danish units in LANDJUT. These forces are manned at low levels, equipped with 1950's vintage weapons, and are even more poorly trained than the units in Jutland. More important, in comparison with the Polish, East German, and (especially) Soviet assault forces they are likely to face on the battlefield, the Danish troops generally are equipped with older, less capable weapons and do not appear to be as well trained.

**Page#** 8


**Blank Page or Missing from Archival Copy**

~~Top Secret~~




~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~



~~Top Secret~~



### Appendix C

### Warsaw Pact Air Operations Versus Denmark

In the first five or six days of offensive operations in a Central European conflict, the Soviets and their Pact allies would carry out an air operation—a series of some five to seven massed airstrikes combined with conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles and cannon and rocket artillery employed in a defense suppression role. The air operation is designed to achieve air supremacy—reducing NATO's inventory of combat aircraft on the Continent by 40 to 50 percent—and to reduce NATO's nuclear delivery capabilities as quickly as possible following the onset of hostilities. The air operation would be conducted on three or four axes, with the preponderance of aircraft operating on the Ruhr and Frankfurt axes against airfields in NATO's Central Region, in support of the theater's main offensive.

There are 54 NATO airfields that would support combat aircraft in Central Europe in the event of hostilities. All are likely to be attacked at least once during the initial air operation. Of the 54 airfields, six are located in Denmark. If reinforcement of NATO airfields proceeded according to current plans, some three of the six Danish airfields would be equipped with high-quality aircraft—approximately 100 F-15s and F-16s—within six days of a mobilization decision.\* Although all six airfields would probably be struck at least once during the course of the air operation, the three equipped with Danish or US F-16s and F-15s would almost certainly be attacked repeatedly if allied aircraft were not relocated to other airfields.

If the initial Warsaw Pact air operation in Central Europe were successful and air supremacy were achieved within five days as planned, more Soviet and Pact air assets might then be available for a variety of other tasks, including strikes in preparation for seizure of the Danish Straits. The aircraft likely to

#### Warsaw Pact Air Units and Aircraft That Could Attack NATO

<b>4th Strategic Air Army (Legnica)</b>	
7 or 8 light bomber regiments	240 Su-24 Fencers
3 fighter-escort regiments	130 Su-27 Flankers and MiG-23 Floggers
<b>46th Strategic Air Army (Smolensk)</b>	
11 medium bomber regiments	115 Tu-16 Badgers 60 Tu-22 Blinders 110 Tu-22M Backfires
<b>Baltic Fleet Air Forces</b>	
3 Soviet medium bomber regiments	42 Tu-22M Backfires
1 East German fighter-bomber wing	30 Su-22 Fitter K's
1 Polish fighter-bomber regiment	50 MiG-17 Frescos
<b>Coastal Front Air Forces</b>	
7 Polish fighter-bomber regiments	135 Su-22 Fitter C/K's 30 Su-7 Fitter A's 145 MiG-17 Frescos
3 Polish fighter regiments	110 MiG-21 Fishbed D/F/J's
1 East German fighter-bomber wing	30 Su-22 Fitter-K's
2 East German fighter wings	50 MiG-21 Fishbed D/F's 35 MiG-23 Flogger B/G's
3 Soviet fighter-bomber regiments	45 MiG-21 Fishbed L/N's 45 MiG-27 Flogger D/J's 45 Su-25 Frogfoot
1 Soviet fighter regiment	42 MiG-29 Fulcrum A's

\* Not including possible reinforcement by combat aircraft of a US Marine Corps air wing.

~~Top Secret~~

participate in preparatory strikes—maintaining air supremacy and providing direct air support during an attempt to seize the straits—would be drawn temporarily from the organizations and assets listed above. Given Soviet estimates of reasonable attrition, about 75 percent—some 1,100 aircraft—of the Pact assets listed might still be available after five days of hostilities, the earliest that preparatory strikes might reasonably be expected to begin. Nonetheless, competing tasks would remain. For example, after completing the initial air operation in the Western TMO, the 4th Air Army (Legnica) would have continuing mission commitments in support of the main offensive against NATO's center on the Ruhr and Frankfurt axes. The 46th Air Army (Smolensk) also would have continuing commitments, not only in the Western TMO but also in neighboring theaters as well. Hence, the number of aircraft drawn from these two air armies to support operations against Denmark probably would be small, and the duration of their

involvement limited. On the other hand, the air assets of the Coastal Front probably would be dedicated in toto to supporting the front. Such operations, however, would involve not only air support for the airborne and amphibious assault in connection with the attempt to seize the Danish Straits, but also support for the front's ground force offensives on both the Jutland and North Sea coastal axes. As a result, the number of aircraft available in support of the airborne-amphibious assault would be relatively small. In addition, most of the front's aircraft are obsolescent and have realistic combat radii of less than 400 kilometers.

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~